We investigate transmission of information in a network in the presence of an adversary that can eavesdrop k channels and inject d errors into the network at the same time. We propose a deterministic construction of a secure error-correcting (SEC) network codes which can transmit information at rate m -2d -k to all the sink nodes which protecting the information from eavesdropping and contamination by the adversary, where m is the minimum maxflow among all the sink nodes. We also show that this rate is optimal.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a real network, data transmission may suffer from two kinds of adversaries: contamination and eavesdropping. Here contamination refers to the distortion on the transmission, such as random errors, link failures, traffic congestion and malicious modifications. Network coding for combating these two kinds of adversaries have been studied in the literature.
The concept of network error correction coding, a generalization of classical error correction coding, was introduced by Cai and Yeung [3] [4] [5] . They generalized the Hamming bound, the Singleton bound and the GilbertVarshamov bound in classical error correction coding to network coding. A refined version of these bounds are proved by [10] and [11] . Zhang [6] introduced the minimum rank for linear network codes, which plays a role similar to that of the minimum distance in decoding classical error-correcting codes. Recently, network generalizations of the Hamming weight, the Hamming distance, and the minimum distance of network codes have been obtained by Yang and Yeung [9] . In terms of the minimum distance, the capability of a network code for error correction, error detection, and erasure correction can be fully characterized.
The eavesdropping problem has been addressed by Cai and Yeung [2] . They introduced a communication system on a wiretap network (CSWN), which consists of a collection W of subsets of channels. A eavesdropper can arbitrarily choose one but only one subset W E Wand fully access all the channels in the subset W. The communicators over a CSWN know the collection W but do not know which subset W is chosen by the eavesdropper. They proposed in [2] a secure network coding scheme based on a given decodable linear network code.
In this paper, we consider an adversary that can: ii) contaminate the transmission on a subset of at most d channels.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a construction of deterministic network codes which can transmit information to all the sink nodes at rate m2d -k with complete reliability and information-theoretic security. We also shown that the rate m-2d-k is optimal in the presence of such an adversary. We call the codes so constructed secure error-correcting (SEC) network codes. The security of the code is rigorously established based on a very general model in which the adversary can use the information obtained through eavesdropping in a causal manner. The details will be explained later.
A similar problem was studied in [7, 8] with the inaction assumption, Le., the adversary contaminates the same subset of channels for a long period of time.
II. CODE CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we present a code construction by cascading an error-correcting network code construction with a secure network code construction. The existence of such a code will also be shown while the error-correcting capability and the secure issue of the result network code will be analyzed in the next section. The construction consists of four parts. Part 1 is to utilize a given linear multicast as an error-correcting network code with distance achieving the refined Singleton bound [4] by choosing a suitable input subspace at the source node. The technique involved can also be found in [4] . Parts 2 to 4 involve the steps of transforming the constructed error-correcting network code into a SEC code. This idea is originated in the work [12] . Most of the techniques involved in constructing a secure network code can be found in [2] .
For two subsets VI, V 2 C IF~+k, their sum is the set defined by where w is an integer whose value is to be specified. Denote by W a collection of subsets W of the edge set E such that IWI < k.
Construction 1:
i) Let an m-dimensional linear multicast with global encoding kernels {Ie} be given, and let w+k < m+ 1.
In [4] 
X'Q-l in the presence of up to d errors. Therefore, the sink nodes can recover x' and hence x. Now, let us check the security condition. We first assume that no error is injected into the network. We first fix an arbitrary set W of k' ::; k channels, el, e2, ... , ek' such that {fel' fe2' ..., fek' } forms a set of linear independent vectors and assume that it is the set of eavesdropped channels. Then the information transmitted on the k' channels will be x'Q-IGfel,x'Q-IGfe2, ...,x'Q-IGfek" respectively. Or equivalently, (2) 'o:' .;' 'o:' .;'
'o:'t:
The existence of Q can be justified by standard techniques. See for example [13] .
The existence of such a set of vectors will be justified later on. We can extend b 1 (5) (6)
f EVil, 
which is non-singular.
iii) The information source X takes values in IFw while the independent randomness R takes values in IF k according to the uniform distribution. Let the message x be a row vector in IFw, and let the outcome r of R be a row vector in IF k . Let X' = (X,R) and the outcome of X' be x' = (x, r). eavesdropped channels are (10) o:
III. SECURITY AND ERROR-CORRECTION CAPABILITY
In this section, we show that the code constructed in the previous section can transmit at rate m -2d -k with reliability and information-theoretic security in the presence of an adversary that can eavesdrop any set of k channels and can inject up to d errors in the network.
Proof In Construction 1, by letting d min = 2d + 1, we obtain a linear network code that transmits information at rate w = m -2d -k. All we have to show is that the code satisfies the error correcting condition and the security condition. We first verify the error correcting condition. By the result in [9] , every sink node can decode Assume that the rank of G 2 is less than k'. There must exist a k' -dimensional non-zero column vector v such that probabilistic injection of errors based on both the information obtained so far by the adversary and the random errors z ran, and is under the control of the adversary.
We will show that the code we constructed in the last section is indeed secure under this highly advantageous assumption for the eavesdropper. Let {a(l) , a(2), . . . , a(k)} be the set of k channels that the adversary chooses to eavesdrop where the indexing is consistent with the partial order of the edges in the network. In order words, a( i) ::; a(j), Vi < j . Assume that VI ::; j ::; 1£1, there exists 1 ::; i j ::; k such that either a(i j ) < j and j ::; a(i j + 1), or a(i) < j , VI ::; i ::; k , And we assume that the adversary has the ability to decide what errors to be injected into the downstream of the network based on the information it obtained in the upstream.
Let Y j , 1 ::; j ::; k, be the symbols transmitted on the edge a(j) when there is no error injected into the network and let YJ, 1 ::; j ::; k, be the symbols transmitted on the edge a(j) when there are errors in the network (either random or injected). We further assume that for every channel chosen, the eavesdropper always eavesdrops at the receiving end of the channel, that is, after the errors are injected if there is any. This assumption can be justified because in our model , the adversary are assumed to know not only the injected errors, but also the random errors that are happening on every channels. The information that the adversary can obtain by eavesdropping the receiving end of the channels allows it to calculate the information at the transmitting end of the channels. Therefore Vj , 1 ::; j ::; k, (18) (19) (20) ( 
21)
Pr{Y w = ylX = x}
= (x,r) 0
This contradicts the fact that all symbols obtained by the eavesdropper are mixture of the symbols from X and R . Therefore, the rank of G2 must be k' .
For all subset W of k' channels, Yw E JFk' and x E JFw , which is independent of x. Therefore,
where g~(-)s are deterministic functions depend only on the local encoding kernels of the network. From now on, we assume that errors can occur on all the edges in the network and we will prove that under this assumption, the eavesdropper still cannot obtain any useful information. Let £ = {I, 2, ... , I£I} , where the indexing is consistent with the partial order of edges in the network.
Assume that on each edge i E £ , the error is an addition of two components, as illustrated in Figure 1 
'v.
"l.T k zin
z~n Zran)where (42) follows from (22), both (44) and (47) 
. . from (23) and (48) 
(59)
Summing over all j and applying the chain rule for mutual information, we get Therefore, where zin = (zt n, 1 :S i :S 1£1).
lSee [13] , Ch. 3.
(39)
That is, the code we constructed in the last section is indeed secure. D Next, we prove that m -2d -k is an upper bound on the rate of a SEC network code in the presence of an adversary that can eavesdrop k channels and inject d errors. The proof here is an extension of the one in [14] . In establishing this result, we need a set of inequalities due to Han [1] where GM is a w x m generator matrix for the message and GR is a k' x m matrix and the exact value of GM and GR depend on the local encoding kernels of the linear network code considered. The rank of GM must be w for the message to be decodable at the sink nodes. Furthermore, 
where the second equality follows from (69) and the last equality follows from the requirement for the code to be secured. Summing over all I, we have 
H(X) + H(R)~H(X, R)
where X is uniformly distributed. Therefore, at least k symbols of randomness need to be introduced. 
where (92) follows from the fact that \ly E ({gr,i, 1 :S i :S k, Vj, 1 :S j :S 2d}) ,3r E IFk, Z E IF m, [z] :S 2d such that y = rG R + z.
By (88), the rank of GM must be less than m-2d-k+ 1. Otherwise, the sink node cannot decode the information successfully. Therefore, the maximum rate at which information can be transmitted from the source node to all the sink nodes is at most m -2d -k.
That is, the code is insecure. Therefore, at least k symbols of randomness again need to be introduced. Now, assume that k symbols of randomness are introduced. For the network code to correct any d errors injected into £t, \lxl,x2 E IFw,XI i= x2,rl,r2 E IFk, and
